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Many past examinations of memory changes in individuals with posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) have focused on changes in memory for trauma. However, it is unclear
if these mnemonic differences extend beyond the memory of the trauma to memory
for other positive and negative information and if they are speciﬁc to individuals with
PTSD or extend to other individuals who have experienced trauma. The present study
examined the inﬂuences of trauma exposure and PTSD on an effect that may parallel
tunnel memory in PTSD: the emotion-induced memory trade-off, whereby emotional
aspects of an experience are remembered at the expense of the nonemotional context.
Three groups of participants (25 with current PTSD, 27 who had experienced trauma but
did not have current PTSD, and 25 controls who had neither experienced signiﬁcanttrauma
nor met criteria for current PTSD) were shown complex visual scenes that included an
item (positive, negative, or neutral) placed on a neutral background. Forty-ﬁve minutes
later, participants underwent a recognition memory test for the items and backgrounds
separately. An emotion-induced memory trade-off was said to occur when there was a
signiﬁcant difference in item and background memory for emotional scenes, but not for
neutral scenes. Results indicated that people with PTSD, like the other groups, were more
likely to remember positive and negative items than neutral items. Moreover, people with
PTSD exhibited a memory trade-off comparable in magnitude to that exhibited by the
non-trauma control group. In contrast, trauma-exposed people without a current diagnosis
of PTSD did not show a trade-off, because they remembered items within scenes better
than their accompanying contexts not only for emotional but also for neutral scenes. These
results suggest that (1) the effect of emotion on memory for visual scenes is similar in
people with PTSD and control participants, and (2) people who have experienced trauma,
but do not have PTSD, may have a different way of attending to and remembering visual
scenes, exhibiting less of a memory trade-off than either control participants or people
with PTSD.
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INTRODUCTION
Exposure to trauma may induce cognitive changes in the mem-
ory system (see Vasterling and Brewin, 2005). These mnemonic
changes may be especially pronounced when posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD; Breslau, 2002) develops. PTSD is characterized
by abnormalities in memory andattention (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000). Individuals with PTSD have difﬁculty con-
centrating on or attending to neutral stimuli, while at the same
time exhibiting hypervigilance, or increased sensitivity to detect-
ing threat (see Vasterling and Brewin, 2005). People with PTSD
also exhibit involuntary re-experiencing of their trauma (e.g.,
ﬂashbacks) despite intentionally avoiding stimuli associated with
the trauma (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).
Although PTSD is deﬁned by cognitive changes in involun-
tary memory for a traumatic incident (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000), there is also interest in understanding how
PTSD may affect the voluntary retrieval of emotional experiences.
Studies assessing memory for trauma-related information have
yielded mixed results as to whether people with PTSD remem-
ber stimuli that are related to their trauma better than people
who have experienced trauma but do not have PTSD. Some
studies have found that when participants are asked to freely
recall trauma-related and non-trauma-related words embedded
in an attentional task (such as an emotional Stroop task), peo-
ple with PTSD remember proportionally more traumatic words
thandonon-patientcontrols(Kaspietal.,1995;Vranaetal.,1995;
Chemtob et al., 1999). Yet other studies have suggested that PTSD
patients may show a response bias to endorse any trauma-related
stimulus (Litz et al., 1996)o rm a yh a v ep a r t i c u l a r l yb a dm e m o r y
for non-trauma stimuli rather than particularly good memory
for trauma-relevant stimuli (McNally et al., 1998; Paunovic et al.,
2002; Golier et al., 2003).
While no consensus has been reached regarding the effect of
PTSD on voluntary retrieval of trauma-related information, even
less is known about the effect of PTSD on memory for emo-
tional information that is not related to the trauma. The ﬁndings
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for negative stimuli have been mixed, with some studies ﬁnding
no exaggerated enhancement in memory in people with PTSD
(Bremner, 2003; Dickie et al., 2008; Brohawn et al., 2010)a n d
others showing that PTSD patients may be biased to endorseneg-
ative stimuli (Thomaes et al., 2011)or to claimto vividly recollect
negative stimuli (Tapia et al., 2012).
Fewer studies have investigated memory for positive informa-
tion. Because one of the symptoms of PTSD is emotional numb-
ness to positive stimuli, it is possible that people with PTSD may
experience changes in memory for positive information (Jatzko
et al., 2006). However, the existing studies examining memory
for positive stimuli did not ﬁnd group differences in memory for
positive images when comparing individuals with and without
PTSD (Brohawn et al., 2010; Tapia et al., 2012), and when com-
paring those with and without acute stress disorder (Paunovic
et al., 2002). However, in the studies conducted by Brohawn et al.
(2010)an dPaunovic et al. (2002), the positive stimuli weresignif-
icantly less arousing than the negative stimuli. So although these
studies suggest that memory for positively valenced information
is preserved in PTSD, the results cannot speak to potential effects
of PTSD on memory for positive images that are also high in
arousal. Thus, the impact of PTSD on memory for positive or
negative stimuli is still an open question. The ﬁrst goal of the
presentstudy, then, isto examine whether PTSDaffects the ability
to remember emotional items—positive or negative.
Despite the lack of consensus about the effect of PTSD on the
quantity of emotional information retained, there may be differ-
ences in the quality of the trauma memory. Trauma narratives
in PTSD have been described as exhibiting “tunnel memory,”
or a detailed memory for the emotional element or gist of the
scene without much memory for the surrounding elements or
contextual details (Safer et al., 1998; LaBar, 2007). For exam-
ple, an individual with PTSD might have a vivid memory of a
body in combat but not remember the details of where the body
was found. However, it is unclear if tunnel memory in PTSD
is qualitatively different from tunnel memory in people without
PTSD.
The concept of tunnel memory—characterized by differen-
tial memory for central and peripheral elements of a scene,
as well as missing pieces of information—is notably similar to
a now well-established phenomenon of memory in individu-
als without a history of trauma or PTSD: the emotion-induced
memory trade-off. The trade-off refers to the retention of emo-
tional information at the expense of surrounding nonemotional
information (see Reisberg and Heuer, 2004; Levine and Edelstein,
2009). For instance, after viewing a scene that contains an emo-
tional element—such as a snake in the forest—people will often
remember the snake well but have poor memory for the forest.
There is reason to believe that tunnel memory in individ-
uals with PTSD is supported by mechanisms similar to those
that evoke the emotion-induced memory trade-off in individ-
uals without PTSD. Higher anxiety levels and lower levels of
cognitive control (e.g., lower ability to manage other cognitive
processes, leading to poorer ability to plan, think abstractly, etc.)
have been correlated with a stronger memory trade-off (Waring
etal.,2010).Becausethose whodevelopPTSDtendtohavehigher
levels of anxiety and lower levels of cognitive control than those
who do not develop PTSD (see van der Kolk, 2004), people with
PTSD might be expected to show more of a trade-off. However,
the magnitude of the trade-off effect has not been systematically
tested in a population with PTSD, and so the validity of this
hypothesis is unknown. The second goal of the present study is to
examine whetherindividualswithPTSDmightshowanenhanced
trade-off as compared to control participants. In other words,
wouldthetunnel memoryreported fortraumamemoryextend to
amemorytrade-offinvoluntaryrecallofothertypesofemotional
information?
Lastly,despitetheresearchthathasbeendonespeciﬁcallylook-
ing at individuals with PTSD, it is often not clear if these changes
in memory are unique to PTSD or if they are a consequence of
extreme stress. Many of the studies that have examined emotional
memory in PTSD have not included a trauma-exposed control
group without current PTSD. Thus, these studies show that peo-
ple with PTSD exhibit differences in emotional and cognitive
processing compared to non-traumatized individuals but cannot
determine if these processes are caused by PTSD speciﬁcally or
trauma exposure itself.
Thereisreasontobelievethatexposuretotrauma—orextreme
or repeated stress—can cause changes in memory (see Kim and
Diamond, 2002 for review). It has been fairlywell established that
exposure to chronic and severe stress can decrease hippocampal
connectivity and impair memory (see McEwen, 1999; Starkman
et al., 2001). However, much less work has been done on the
effects of stress exposure on the retention of emotional informa-
tion. The few existing studies have revealed that chronic stress
may enhance amygdala functioning (Vyas et al., 2002, 2003)a n d
enhance fear conditioning in rats (Conrad et al., 1999). Because
the amygdala has been shown to enhance memory for emo-
tional items, but not for their contexts (Kensinger and Schacter,
2006; Waring and Kensinger, 2011), there is reason to believe that
exposure to stress may enhance emotional memory but decrease
memory for surrounding neutral information.
This pattern of results has been found when stress is induced
in a laboratory setting. Payne et al. (2006) found that acute
psychosocial stress may enhance thematically induced trade-offs
in emotional memory. In this study participants were exposed
to a psychosocial stressor before watching a slide show with
an emotional narrative. During a later memory test, partici-
pants who had undergone this stressor (as opposed to those
who were not stressed at encoding) were more likely to remem-
ber emotional aspects of the slide show and were more likely
to forget the neutral aspects. This ﬁnding indicates that stress
at encoding may play a role in trade-offs between emotional
and neutral aspects—at least in the instance of a thematically
induced emotional narrative (as opposed to an emotional visual
scene). However, it is unclear if a previously experienced stress
in trauma-exposed individuals would also have similar trade-off-
inducing effect. Thus, the third goal of this study is to investigate
the effects of trauma-exposure, without current PTSD, on the
emotion-induced memory trade-off.
To summarize, the purpose of this study is to investigate these
three questions: (1) What is the effect of PTSD on memory for
positive, negative, and neutral items? (2) What is the effect of
PTSD on an emotion-induced memory trade-off? (3) What is
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the effect of trauma-exposure on an emotion-induced memory
trade-off? In the current study, these questions were addressed by
testing people with PTSD, people who experienced trauma but
do not currently have PTSD, and a control group who reported
no experience of trauma. All participants studied scenes that
included a positive, negative, or neutral item placed on a neutral
background. Memory was then tested separately for emotional
and neutral items and their accompanying backgrounds. In this
way, we can compare memory for emotional versus neutral items
in the three participant groups (addressing question 1), as well as
therelationbetween memoryfortheemotionalitemandmemory
for the surrounding information in the background (addressing
questions 2 and 3).
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Eighty-six individuals were recruited via postings on the Internet,
throughoutthecommunity,andatalocaltraumacenter.Presence
of PTSD was determined by diagnosis on the Structured Clinical
Interview for the DSM-IV (SCID; First et al., 1995)b yaq u a l i -
ﬁed clinician. Trauma exposure was determined by the SCID and
according to DSM-IV criteria. Of the 86 individuals recruited for
the study, 77 were used in the analysis. Two participants were
excluded from analysis because they had high PTSD Checklist
and Depression scores although they reported thatthey hadnever
experienced trauma. Two were excluded due to psychotic disor-
ders and one was excluded for current alcohol dependence. One
was excluded for refusing to answer questions on the PTSD por-
tion of the SCID, and three were excluded for failure to complete
the second part of the study. Of the remaining 77 participants,
25 met criteria for current PTSD (PTSD group, 8 Males); 27 had
undergone trauma but did not meet criteria for current PTSD
(Trauma-Exposed group, 14 Males); and 25 neither had expe-
rienced signiﬁcant trauma nor met criteria for current PTSD
(Non-TraumaExposedgroup,12Males;SeeTable 1).Inthe Non-
trauma Exposed Group, there were no comorbidities. None of
these 77 participants had a psychotic disorder or current alco-
hol or substance dependence. The groups did not differ on age
or education level (See Table 2).
STIMULI
Stimuli consisted of complex visual scenes that were created by
placing images of positive, negative and neutral items onto neu-
tral background scenes (see Figure1). The stimulus set included
objects and backgrounds used in prior studies (Kensinger
et al., 2007a; Waring and Kensinger, 2009; Waring et al., 2010;
Steinberger et al., 2011). Composite images were created by plac-
ing an item onto a plausible background scene. Care was taken
to make sure that positive, negative, and neutral items were of
comparable size and were placed in the same approximate loca-
tion across scenes. Across emotion categories, scenes were also
matched for visual complexity, congruency between item and
background, and number of people, animals and buildings. Each
picture was approximately 10 × 13 in. and 700 × 550 pixels.
Items were 180 nameable, photographic-quality, color images
that were taken from photo clip art packages (Hemera
Technologies, Quebec, Canada), from the International Affective
PictureSystem(Langetal.,1999)andfromotheronlinedatabases
of images. There were 60 positive images (mean valence = 6.02,
SE = 0.81),60negativeimages(meanvalence= 3.80,SE = 0.82)
and60neutralimages(meanvalence = 5.29,SE = 0.75).Arousal
(rated on a ﬁvepoint scale, with low numbers indicating soothing
or subduing images and high numbers indicating exciting or agi-
tatingimages)ratingswereasfollows:mean(SD):Positive = 3.02
(0.57); Negative = 3.19 (0.66); Neutral = 2.35 (0.61). The posi-
tive and negative images were matched on arousal and absolute
valence (all p > 0.30), and neutral images were considered less
arousing than both positive and negative images (all p < 0.05).
Stimuli were randomized to create two different study lists
with 90 items per list (30 negative, 30 positive and 30 neutral).
Those lists were then alsopresented in reverse order,yielding four
total study lists that were counterbalanced across participants. It
was never the case that more than three of the same emotion
category appeared in a row.
At test, composite scenes from the study sessions were bro-
kendowninto the isolateditem andbackgroundcomponents and
these two elements were shown independently in the recognition
memory test. The recognition memory test was also randomized
for a total of four test lists to ensure that there were not effects
of placement of a certain picture in context to another picture.
These test lists were counterbalanced across participants. In addi-
tion, which items and backgrounds were “old” versus “new” were
counterbalanced across participants based on the study list that
they viewed.
PROCEDURE
Participants ﬁrst ﬁlled out the consent form, a demographics
questionnaire, an assessment of their state and trait anxiety [BAI
(Beck et al., 1988); STAI-S and STAI-T (Spielberger et al., 1983)]
and an assessment of their depressive symptoms (BDI-II; Beck
et al., 1961).
Participants then took part in an incidental encoding session.
They were told that this ﬁrst part of the study was designed to
measure their reactions to emotional images. During this session,
90scenes(30fromeachemotion category)wereshownonawhite
computer screen for 5s each. While viewing the scene, partici-
pants were askedto rate the valence ofthe picture on a nine-point
scale, nine being the most intensely positive and one being the
most intensely negative. After 5s, a screen appeared that required
the participant to press the space bar to move on to the next pic-
ture. Each participant completed a short practice version of the
task before performing the actual task.
After participants completed the encoding session, a variety of
standardized cognitive tasks were administered, creating a reten-
tion delay of approximately 45min: Rey–Osterrieth Complex
Figure Test (Rey–O; Rey, 1941; Osterrieth, 1944), Stroop Test
(Stroop, 1935), Wechsler Backward Digit Span (Wechsler, 1997),
FAS test of verbal ﬂuency (Spreen and Benton, 1977), Shipley
Vocabulary (Shipley,1986), TheWechsler AdultIntelligence Scale
D i g i tS y m b o lT e s t( Wechsler, 1997), Short Michigan Alcoholism
Screening Test (SMAST, Selzer et al., 1975). At this point partici-
pants were also given a 5–10min break.
During the unanticipated recognition testing phase, partici-
pants viewed 90 items and 90 backgrounds extracted separately
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Table 1 | Type of trauma and comorbidities for the PTSD and the Trauma-Exposed Groups.
Sex Trauma Comorbidity Past PTSD?
PTSD GROUP
F Arrest None
F Captivity None
M Family tragedy None
F Family tragedy Pho
F Family tragedy None
F Family tragedy None
F Physical abuse None
M Physical and psychological abuse None
F Physical and psychological abuse Epi
M Physical and psychological abuse BPD, BED
F Physical and sexual assault MDD, Pho, OCD
F Physical and sexual assault None
M Physical assault GAD
M Physical assault None
F Physical assault MDD, PD, OCD
F Physical, sexual, psychological abuse None
F Physical and psychological abuse MS, MDD, PD, Pho
M Physical and psychological abuse MDD
F Sexual assault MDD, GAD, BED
M Sexual assault MDD, GAD
F Sexual assault MDD, PD
F Sexual assault Epi, MDD
F Sexual assault None
M Sexual assault MDD
F Sexual assault None
TRAUMA-EXPOSED GROUP
M Arrest None No
MA r r e s t G A D N o
M Captivity None Yes
M Family tragedy Pho No
M Family tragedy GAD No
F Family tragedy None No
F Family tragedy None Yes
M Motor vehicle accident BPD, Pho, OCD No
M Motor vehicle accident Epi No
M Motor vehicle accident None No
M Motor vehicle accident None No
F Motor vehicle accident None No
F Motor vehicle accident None Yes
F Physical and psychological abuse MDD, Dys Yes
F Physical and psychological abuse Dys Yes
F Physical assault Pho Yes
M Physical assault Pho Yes
F Physical assault PD Yes
M Physical assault None No
M Physical assault BPD Yes
F Physical assault None Yes
M Physical assault GAD Yes
F Sexual abuse None Yes
F Sexual abuse, captivity MDD, Pho Yes
F Sexual assault None No
M Witnessed death Pho, BED No
F Witnessed death Dys Yes
MDD, major depressive disorder; GAD, generalized anxiety disorder; BED, binge eating disorder; PD, panic disorder; Pho, phobia; OCD, obsessive compulsive
disorder; Epi, epilepsy; BPD, bipolar disorder; Alc, alcohol dependence; Dys, dysthymic disorder.
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 34 | 4Mickley Steinmetz et al. Emotion-induced memory trade-off PTSD
Table 2 | Demographic, cognitive, and psychopathological characteristics of the samples.
PTSD Trauma-exposed Non-trauma-exposed Statistics
N = 25 N = 27 N = 25
Sex (male/female) (8/17) (14/13) (12/13) χ2(1) = 1.05, ns
Age 39.68 (14.28) 42.0 (15.22) 36.2 (15.11) F(2,74) = 0.99, ns
Years of education 14.52 (3.12) 14.44 (2.38) 14.84 (2.51) F(2,74) = 0.16, ns
Age of trauma 20.76 (12.99) 26.0 (13.99) n/a t(47) = 1.36, ns
Years since trauma 17 .04 (14.4) 16.0 (13.53) n/a t(47) = 0.26, ns
PCL 55.78 (13.04) 36.74 (13.62) 21.88 (6.27) F(2,74) = 54.27, p < 0.001
BDI 20.24 (10.61) 11.89 (8.34) 4.32 (4.67) F(2,74) = 23.32, p < 0.001
BAI 28.24 (10.72) 18.78 (14.39) 6.92 (7 .6) F(2,74) = 22.17, p < 0.001
STAI-T 53.26 (10.83) 42.33 (10.21) 31.56 (7 .02) F(2,74) = 32.49, p < 0.001
STAI-S 43.56 (11.78) 37 .93 (12.84) 29.36 (8.37) F(2,74) = 10.18, p < 0.001
FAS 45.28 (10.83) 39.59 (12.64) 44.48 (11.69) F(2,74) = 1.80, ns
FAS perseverations 0.92 (1.29) 1.56 (2.98) 1.56 (1.78) F(2,74) = 0.73, ns
Stroop_word 96.4 (23.2) 97 .07 (18.32) 100.8 (17 .13) F(2,74) = 0.37, ns
Stroop_X 68.88 (17 .0) 65.7 (12.76) 72.72 (12.96) F(2,74) = 1.56, ns
Stroop_color 43.04 (14.46) 38.81 (9.34) 48.68 (7 .92) F(2,74) = 5.39, p < 0.01
Stroop_interference 102.44 (10.29) 99.76 (7 .72) 106.67 (6.73) F(2,73) = 4.51, p < 0.05
Digit symbol 36.16 (10.96) 34.15 (8.09) 40.52 (8.45) F(2,74) = 3.21, p < 0.05
Digit span backward 7 .24 (2.83) 6.26 (2.19) 8.44 (2.77) F(2,74) = 4.56, p < 0.05
Shipley 31.04 (7 .07) 28.33 (7 .06) 31.68 (4.61) F(2,74) = 2.04, ns
Rey–O copy 34.4 (3.65) 33.56 (3.03) 34.64 (3.17) F(2,74) = 0.79, ns
Rey–O immediate 20.78 (7 .09) 17 .33 (6.3) 20.8 (9.21) F(2,74) = 1.81, ns
Rey–O delayed 21.54 (6.55) 16.35 (6.5) 21.38 (9.39) F(2,74) = 3.99, p < 0.05
Rey–O recognition 19.92 (1.74) 19.07 (1.75) 20.04 (2.03) F(2,73) = 2.12, ns
SMAST 1.84 (2.51) 1.74 (2.6) 0.56 (1.12) F(2,74) = 2.66, ns
CAPS frequency 1.34 (1.25) 0.74 (1.29) n/a t(43) = 1.59, ns
CAPS intensity 2.0 (1.8) 0.86 (1.55) n/a t(42) = 2.24, p < 0.05
ns, not signiﬁcant; M (SD).
FIGURE 1 | Example stimuli from the study and test session.
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from the studied composite scenes (30 from each emotion cate-
gory), as well as 90 new items (30 from each emotion category)
and 90 new backgrounds (note that all new backgrounds were
by deﬁnition neutral; for the studied backgrounds, the emotion-
ality was deﬁned by the type of item that had been placed onto
the background). For each item or background, participants were
asked to indicate whether they believed the picture was new,
whether they “remembered” it (recollected speciﬁc details of its
presentation during the encoding session) or “knew” it (felt a
sense of familiarity with the picture, withoutremembering details
from the encoding session). Participants underwent an exten-
sive practice and instruction phase to ensure their understanding
of remember versus know ratings. This test was self-paced and
the next picture appeared after participants made their response.
There were no group differences in reaction time for the test
responses.
After the test phase, participants were asked to ﬁll out the
PTSD checklist (PCL; Weathers et al., 1993)a n dt h eL i f eE v e n t s
Checklist (Gray et al., 2004). For the PTSD and the Trauma-
exposed groups, the presence of PTSD, as well as other comorbid
disorders, was assessed using the SCID in a separate session. The
severity of memory problems surrounding the trauma was also
assessed using selected questions from the clinician-administered
PTSD scale (CAPS).
DATA ANALYSIS
For all of the results presented here, “remember” and “know”
responses were collapsed into all “old” responses (When the
“remember” and “know” responses were analyzed separately, no
main effect of group or interactions with group were found).
For behavioral memory data, corrected memory scores are
ﬁrst reported. For these corrected scores, the proportion of false
alarms(new picturesthatwere incorrectlycitedasbeingold)were
subtracted from the proportion of hits (pictures that were cor-
rectly recognized as being old) in order to correct for a response
bias to call a picture “old.” These corrected recognition scores
were computed separately for each item type (positive, negative,
neutral) and for backgrounds. Note that only one false alarm
rate could be ascertained for backgrounds: by deﬁnition new
backgrounds are neutral because the emotionality of a back-
ground relates to the type of item with which it had been
studied. In later analyses, the hit rates and false alarm rates were
analyzed separately, to clarify whether differences in corrected
recognition stemmed from differences in the hit rate or the false
alarm rate.
Analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) were run in order to com-
pare the memory based on valence and group while controlling
for scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) and Rey–O
Complex Figure Test Delayed. A Bonferroni correction was used
for the estimated marginal means in the post hoc tests. These
scores were used as covariates because there were signiﬁcant
group differences in mood and in cognition. Because the var-
ious mood measures were intercorrelated, as were the various
cognitive measures, we selected the BDI and Rey–O tasks as the
covariates because we felt that they were the most representa-
tive of the co-morbidities and visuo-spatial cognitive abilities for
which we should control.
RESULTS
PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS AND COGNITIVE TEST SCORES
Groups did not differ on any socio-demographic level (see
Table 2). However, the groups did differ signiﬁcantly on the
scales measuring the severity of PTSD [PCL; (F(2, 74) = 54.27,
p < 0.001)], level of depression [BDI-II (F(2, 74) = 23.32, p <
0.001)], and level of anxiety [BAI (F(2,74) = 22.17, p < 0.001);
STAI-T (F(2, 74) = 32.49, p < 0.001); STAI-S (F(2, 74) = 10.18,
p < 0.001)]. The groups also differed signiﬁcantly on several
cognitive tasks: Stroop Color [F(2, 74) = 5.39, p < 0.01]; Stroop
Interference [F(2, 73) = 4.51, p < 0.05]; Digit-Symbol [F(2, 74) =
3.21, p < 0.05]; Digit Span Backwards [F(2, 74) = 4.56, p <
0.05]; Rey–O delayed [F(2, 74) = 3.99, p < 0.05].
There alsoweresome signiﬁcantsex differences. Overall,males
had higher Shipley vocabulary scores, [t(71.7) = 2.011, p < 0.05],
than females. Males were also older (“Age”) at the time of test
than females, [t(75) = 2.29, p < 0.05], and had a higher age of
trauma, [t(27.1) = 2.09, p < 0.05], than females. Overall, females
had higher Beck Anxiety scores, [t(75) = 3.06, p < 0.01], than
males. Females also scored higher than males on both the Rey–O
Immediate, [t(75) = 2.56, p < 0.05], and the Rey–O Delayed,
[t(75) = 2.59, p < 0.05], visual memory tasks.
PICTURE RATINGS
An analysis was conducted on the picture ratings at encoding in
order to make sure that there were not differences in the way that
the pictures were rated by the three different groups. These rat-
ings weremadeonanine-pointscale,onebeingintensely negative
and nine being intensely positive. A valence (positive, negative,
neutral images) × group (PTSD, Trauma-Exposed, Non-Trauma
Exposed) ANOVA was conducted. This analysis revealed a main
effect of valence on the ratings, [F(2,74) = 148.82, p < 0.001],
but no group effect or valence × group interactions (all F <
1.0, p > 0.45). As expected, all valence types differed signiﬁ-
cantly from each other: positive greater than negative, [t(76) =
13.93,p < 0.001];positivegreaterthanneutral,[t(76) = 9.80,p <
0.001]; neutral greater than negative, [t(76) = 10.57, p < 0.001].
Arousal scores for each participant were calculated as the mean
absolute distance from the neutral rating of ﬁve. An arousal(pos-
itive, negative, neutralimages)×group(PTSD,Trauma-Exposed,
Non-TraumaExposed)ANOVAwasalsoconducted.Thisanalysis
revealed a main effect of arousal on the ratings, [F(2,74) = 10.34,
p < 0.001], but no group effect or arousal × group interactions
(all F < 1.0, p > 0.50). As expected, neutral images were less
arousingthanbothpositiveimages,[t(76) = 6.74,p < 0.001],and
negative images, [t(76) = 2.93, p < 0.01]; there was no signiﬁ-
cant difference in arousal between positive and negative images,
[t(76) = 1.12, p > 0.25].
EMOTION-INDUCED MEMORY TRADE-OFF SCORE
The memory data were ﬁrst analyzed to determine the difference
in memory for emotional items and backgrounds as compared
to neutral. The emotion-induced memory trade-off has been
deﬁned as the combined increase in memory for emotional items
as compared to neutral items and decrease in memory for back-
grounds accompanying emotional items compared to neutral
items. Thus, to calculate a memory trade-off score, corrected
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recognitionscores(hits—falsealarms)forneutralitemsweresub-
tracted from corrected recognition scores for positive or negative
items, and corrected recognition scores for backgrounds paired
with neutral items were subtracted from corrected recognition
scores for backgrounds paired with positive or negative back-
grounds (see Leclerc and Kensinger, 2008; Waring and Kensinger,
2009,f o ru s eo ft h e s et y p e so fd i f f e r e n c es c o r e s ) .
To then calculate the magnitude of the trade-off effect (e.g.,
the discrepancy between item and background memory), these
corrected scores for the backgrounds were subtracted from the
corrected scores for the items. The overall formula was: (mem-
ory for emotional item–memory for neutral item)—(memory
for background paired with emotional item–memory for back-
ground paired with neutral item). Thus, the largest trade-off
occurs when there is both better memory for the emotional
item and worse memory for the accompanying background as
compared to neutral.
For the analyses using this memory trade-off score, a Group
(PTSD, Trauma, Non-Trauma) × Valence (positive, negative)
ANCOVA was conducted with the Beck Depression Inventory
and Rey–O Complex Figure Test Delayed score used as covari-
ates. The pattern of results remained the same when no covariates
were used or when other mood and cognitive scores were used
as covariates. This ANCOVA revealed a main effect of group
[F(2,72) = 4.48, p < 0.05, PES = 0.111; see Figure2]. As indi-
cated by Bonferroni post hoc tests and adjusted marginal means,
for both positive and negative items there was a smaller trade-
off score for the trauma group (mean = 0.10, SE = 0.03) as
compared to the PTSD group (mean = 0.23, SE = 0.04), and a
marginally smaller trade-off for the trauma group as compared
to the Non-trauma group (mean = 0.20, SE = 0.04). There was
notasigniﬁcantdifference between trade-offscoresforpositive or
negative scenes and there were no interactions (all F < 0.5, p >
0.4). There were also no interactions with any of the covariates.
To conﬁrm that depression was not driving this group differ-
ence, a multiple regression was conducted with the emotional
trade-off score as the dependent measure and the predictors
as PTSD Group, Trauma Group (both dummy coded), and
depression. The model was signiﬁcant overall [F(3,76) = 3.886,
p < 0.05]. The analysis revealed only a main effect of the
Trauma Group (β = 0.314, t = 2.32, p = 0.02), suggesting that
the trauma group, and not depression, was the signiﬁcant predic-
tor of the trade-off score.
MEMORY ANALYSES BY COMPONENT
In order to investigate the basis for this difference in the memory
trade-off score, we next conducted an analysis of corrected
recognition scores that considered all scene valences and scene
component types separately. This was a Type (item, back-
ground) × Valence (positive, negative, neutral) × Group (PTSD,
Trauma, Non-Trauma) ANCOVA with the Beck Depression
Inventory and Rey–O Complex Figure Test Delayed score used as
covariates (see Figure3). This analysis revealed a main effect of
type [F(1,72) = 25.66, p < 0.001, PES = 0.263]. This main effect
was qualiﬁed by a type × valence interaction [F(2,72) = 4.80,
p < 0.05; PES = 0.063], and a marginal type × valence ×
group interaction [F(2,72) = 2.25, p < 0.07; PES = 0.059].
This marginal three-way interaction remained present when
other mood and cognitive scores were used as covariates, and it
reached signiﬁcance (p < 0.05) when no covariates were used.
As indicated by the Bonferroni post hoc tests, the PTSD group
and the Non-trauma Exposed group showed a similar pattern
of results such that there was better memory for items than
backgrounds for positive and negative pictures, while there
was not a signiﬁcant item-background discrepancy for neutral
pictures. In contrast, the Trauma group exhibited a signiﬁcant
difference in memory for items as compared to backgrounds for
positive, negative, and neutral pictures. When comparing each
FIGURE 2 | The emotion-induced memory trade-off score ([memory for
emotional item–memory for neutral item]—[memory for background
paired with emotional item–memory for background paired with neutral
item]) for the three groups. White bars indicate memory for scenes that
included positive (pleasant) items. Gray bars indicate memory for scenes that
included negative (unpleasant) items. There was a larger memory trade-off
for both the PTSD and the Non-Trauma Exposed group as compared to the
Trauma-Exposed group.
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FIGURE 3 | Item and background memory for scenes that included a positive, negative, or neutral item.
valence there were no group differences in item memory. There
was only one group difference in background memory, with
better memory in the PTSD group and the Non-trauma Exposed
group as compared to the Trauma group for backgrounds that
had been paired with neutral items (see Figure3). There were no
interactions with any of the covariates.
In order to make sure that the pattern of results for the
Trauma group were not driven by the presence of a prior his-
tory ofPTSD,twosubsequentType (item, background)×Valence
(positive, negative, neutral) ANCOVAs were run with just the
participants in the Trauma group. These analyses also included
the Beck Depression Inventory and Rey–O Complex Figure Test
Delayed score as covariates. The ﬁrst analysis included only those
who previously had PTSD (N = 14). This analysis revealed no
m a i ne f f e c t so ri n t e r a c t i o n s( a l lF < 1.4, p > 0.2). The second
analysisincludedthosewhoneverhadPTSD(N = 13).Thisanal-
ysis revealed only a main effect of type [F(1,10) = 5.17, p < 0.05,
PES = 0.341] such that there was greater item memory than
background memory. Critically, there was no valence × type
interaction for either group. Similarly, when past PTSD was run
as a between subjects factor in a valence × type × past PTSD
ANCOVA, there were no interactions with past PTSD (all F <
1.2, p > 0.2) and no interaction between valence and item type
(F < 0.25, p > 0.6); the only signiﬁcant effect was that of type
[F(1,23) = 6.924, p < 0.05, PES = 0.231].
The prior analyses were run with the corrected memory data
(hits—false alarms). However, hits and false alarmsare listed sep-
arately in Table 3.W h e naT y p e( i t e m ,b a c k g r o u n d )× Valence
(positive, negative, neutral) × Group (PTSD, Trauma, Non-
trauma) ANCOVA (with the Beck Depression Inventory and
Rey–OComplexFigureTestDelayed scoreused ascovariates) was
run on the hit rates, there was the same pattern as when the cor-
rected scores were used: a main effect of type [F(1,72) = 37.19,
p < 0.001, PES = 0.107]qualiﬁed bya type × valence interaction
[F(2,72) = 8.67, p < 0.001; PES = 0.063], and a type × valence ×
group interaction [F(2,72) = 2.80, p < 0.05; PES = 0.072]. When
this ANCOVA was run for the false alarms, there was only a
marginal effect of group [F(2,72) = 2.76, p < 0.07; PES = 0.072]
such that there were fewer false alarms for the PTSD group than
for the trauma-exposed and non-trauma exposed groups.
DISCUSSION
The current study sought to examine changes in memory for
emotional information in individuals who currently meet diag-
nostic criteria for PTSD and trauma-exposed individuals who do
not currently have PTSD. Looking at both item and background
memory in the emotion-induced memory trade-off paradigm,
this investigation focused on three central questions: (1) What is
the effect of PTSD on memory for positive, negative, and neutral
items? (2) What is the effect of PTSD on the emotion-induced
memory trade-off? (3) What is the effect of trauma-exposure
on the emotion-induced memory trade-off? First, we found that
there are no group differences in memory for emotional items.
For all groups emotional items (positive and negative) are better
remembered than neutral items. Second, we found that peo-
ple with PTSD did not have a larger memory trade-off when
compared with control participants who had not experienced
trauma; however, people with PTSD did have a larger mem-
ory trade-off when compared to trauma-exposed controls. A
closer examination of the differences in item and background
memory revealed that while the PTSD and non-trauma exposed
control group had signiﬁcant differences in item memory as com-
pared to background memory for emotional items, there was
no difference between item and background memory for neutral
items. The decreased memory trade-off in the trauma-exposed
controls was driven by a signiﬁcant item-background difference
between both the emotional and the neutral items. Thus, in
answer to the third question, trauma exposure in the absence of
PTSD does seem to change the memory trade-off, resulting in a
mnemonic focus on the item within a scene regardless of whether
that item is emotional or neutral. We expand on each of these
points below.
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Table 3 | Hits and false alarms for item and background memory for
each group and each valence.
Group Mean SD
ITEMS
Hits Positive PTSD 0.79 0.19
Trauma-exposed 0.78 0.18
Non-trauma-exposed 0.79 0.17
Negative PTSD 0.80 0.17
Trauma-exposed 0.81 0.16
Non-trauma-exposed 0.82 0.16
Neutral PTSD 0.61 0.22
Trauma-exposed 0.66 0.22
Non-trauma-exposed 0.65 0.21
False alarms Positive PTSD 0.08 0.09
Trauma-exposed 0.17 0.17
Non-trauma-exposed 0.18 0.22
Negative PTSD 0.10 0.11
Trauma-exposed 0.20 0.18
Non-trauma-exposed 0.15 0.21
Neutral PTSD 0.08 0.08
Trauma-exposed 0.16 0.18
Non-trauma-exposed 0.14 0.20
BACKGROUNDS
Hits Positive PTSD 0.58 0.21
Trauma-exposed 0.58 0.23
Non-trauma-exposed 0.55 0.23
Negative PTSD 0.59 0.19
Trauma-exposed 0.60 0.21
Non-trauma-exposed 0.58 0.19
Neutral PTSD 0.62 0.19
Trauma-exposed 0.58 0.24
Non-trauma-exposed 0.66 0.20
False alarms Positive PTSD 0.12 0.10
Trauma-exposed 0.22 0.19
Non-trauma-exposed 0.19 0.21
Negative PTSD 0.12 0.10
Trauma-exposed 0.22 0.19
Non-trauma-exposed 0.19 0.21
Neutral PTSD 0.12 0.10
Trauma-exposed 0.22 0.19
Non-trauma-exposed 0.19 0.21
WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF PTSD ON MEMORY FOR POSITIVE,
NEGATIVE, AND NEUTRAL ITEMS?
There were not signiﬁcant item memory differences between
groups. All groups remembered positive and negative items bet-
ter than neutral items. The current study found no evidence that
PTSDpatients remember non-trauma-related negative items par-
ticularly well or that they remember positive items particularly
poorly. This suggests that for individuals with PTSD, though the
memory for information related to the trauma may be enhanced,
this does not translate to differences in the general emotion-
memory system.
The results revealed no evidence of an effect of PTSD on the
bias to endorse emotional items as studied: the item recognition
performance of the PTSD group remained similar to the perfor-
mance of the other groups even when recognition responses were
corrected for incorrect endorsements of unstudied items, and if
anything the PTSD group showed lower false alarm rates than the
other participant groups. Although at least one study found that
PTSD may lead to an enhanced response bias for negative infor-
mation when verbal stimuli are used (Thomaes et al., 2011), this
biasing effect has not been found in other studies using verbal
stimuli (Thomaes et al., 2009; Tapia et al., 2012). The few studies
that have assessed recognition memory using non-traumatic pic-
torial stimuli have not reported hits and false alarms separately
(Dickie et al., 2008; Brohawn et al., 2010), but the present results
suggest that PTSD does not always lead to a more liberal response
bias for negative stimuli.
WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF PTSD ON THE EMOTION-INDUCED
MEMORY TRADE-OFF?
The memory trade-off exhibited in PTSD patients did not differ
in magnitude from the trade-off exhibited by the control partic-
ipants who had never experienced trauma. Thus, in some ways,
the memory pattern that the PTSD patients experienced in this
study can be considered “normal,” because, just as in the Control
group, background memory was traded in favor of item mem-
ory only when an emotional item was present and not when a
neutral item was present. As mentioned previously, memories of
trauma in individuals with PTSD have been described as possess-
ing “tunnel memory.” However, it is still unknown if this effect
is enhanced in individuals with PTSD as compared to those with-
outPTSD.Thecurrentstudycannotspeakto “tunnelmemory” in
the trauma memory. However, the current data suggest that non-
trauma memories are not remembered in a unique manner for
individuals with PTSD. Though they do exhibit a “tunnel mem-
ory” ofsorts (e.g., worsememory forbackgroundsthat arepaired
with emotionalinformationthan neutralinformation),this isnot
uniquely exaggerated in PTSD. By contrast, and as we will elabo-
rate upon next, the trauma-exposed individuals without current
PTSD consistently showed selective item memory, regardless of
the emotionality of the item.
It will be interesting for future studies to examine whether a
different pattern is revealed when verbal stimuli are used rather
than visual stimuli. Prior studies have shown that participants
are more likely to remember neutral words from sentences that
include an emotional word as opposed to those same words from
sentences that contain only neutral words (Kensinger et al., 2002;
Medfordetal.,2005).Thus,itseemsthatcontrolparticipantspro-
cess the sentence as one entity (rather than as the discrete words
that make up the sentence) and thus show a memory beneﬁt for
all words within an emotional sentence rather than showing a
trade-off. It would be interesting for future research to examine
whether PTSD patients would show a memory pattern like con-
trol participants or instead would show a trade-off even for these
sentence stimuli.
WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF TRAUMA-EXPOSURE IN INDIVIDUALS
WITHOUT PTSD ON THE EMOTION-INDUCED MEMORY TRADE-OFF?
Our data suggest that the trauma-exposed group stands apart
from the other groups tested, in that these individuals remember
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both emotional and neutral items better than their backgrounds.
This effect could either be seen as a positive coping mechanism or
a negative reaction to stress. Because the trauma-exposed group
hadadiscrepancyinitemandbackgroundmemoryforbothemo-
tional and neutral information, this may indicate that emotional
and neutral stimuli are processed in a similar manner. Perhaps
participants who were exposed to trauma but do not currently
have PTSD have managed to avoid developing PTSD or were able
torecoverfromitbecauseofanabilitytoprocessemotionalevents
in a similar fashion as processing neutral information. On the
other hand, this exaggerated trade-off may mirror the effects of
stress on memory for contextual information. There is evidence
that individuals who are under stress at the time of encoding (via
theTrierSocialStress Testmanipulation;Kirschbaumet al.,1993)
trade off background memory in favor of item memory for neu-
tral as well as emotional scenes (Mattingly et al., 2012). Further,
individuals who are stressed exhibit increased amygdala activity
for both high and low arousal information (Marle et al., 2009),
suggesting that stressed individuals enter a state of “indiscrim-
inate hypervigilance.” Although the trauma-exposed individuals
did not report higher state anxiety or rate the scenes differently
than the other groups, it is nevertheless possible that they have
more global changes in scene processing, such as seen under
these stress manipulations, which lead them to exhibit a more
focused attentional and mnemonic pattern for both emotional
and neutral scenes. In addition, because both of these groups had
trauma-exposure, this effect is speciﬁc to those who had expe-
rienced trauma and do not currently have PTSD. Though it is
d i f ﬁ c u l tt ok n o wf r o mt h ec u r r e n ts t u d yh o wt h ep r e s e n c eo f
trauma with and without PTSD may change emotional process-
ing, it may be that the PTSD group would be more likely to
focus the stress response particularly on their traumatic experi-
ence as opposed to a more diffuse focus in the trauma-exposed
group. In other words, perhaps those who both have experienced
stress/trauma and who have PTSD would mostly show narrowed
focus for things related to their trauma speciﬁcally, whereas those
withstress/trauma butwithoutcurrentPTSDmaymoregenerally
show a narrowed focus, even to neutral stimuli.
One thing of note is that the trauma-exposed group is
impaired on many of the cognitive tests. This could suggest
that these individuals’ attention is more narrowed—regardless
of valence—due to limited processing capacity. However, older
adults, who have more limited processing capacities than young
adults, still show the memory trade-off (Kensinger et al., 2007b;
Waring and Kensinger, 2011). In addition, in the current study,
lower performance on cognitive tests did not relate to the magni-
tude of the memory trade-off, and when the cognitive tests were
used as covariates, there were no interactions with the covariates.
Thus, it is likely not solely a deﬁcit in cognitive capacity which
leads to the selective retention of all items (emotional or neutral)
in this trauma-exposed group.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The current study provides insight into the pattern of emotional
memory in individuals with PTSD and in those who have expe-
rienced trauma but do not have PTSD. When only emotional
items are considered, there is no difference between any of the
groups. Across the board, emotional items (positive and nega-
tive) are better remembered than neutral ones. The PTSD group
showed no difference in the emotional memory trade-off when
compared to the non-trauma-exposed control group. However,
the PTSD group did show a larger emotional memory trade-off
than the trauma-exposed individuals. The trauma-exposed indi-
viduals showed a pattern distinct from the other groups, in that
they traded background memory in favor of item memory for all
item types, emotional and neutral. This pattern of results sug-
gests that the memory trade-off may be differentially exhibited
depending on both the experience of trauma and the presence of
PTSD.
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